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RECONCILING THE PARADOX OF TRIBAL
SOVEREIGNTY: THREE FRAMEWORKS
FOR DEVELOPING INDIAN GAMING
LAW AND POLICY*
Steven Andrew Light t & Kathryn R.L. Randt
Wow, man - Indians have it good! - Eric, upon arriving at the "Three Feathers"
casino, on Fox television's "South Park"'
I. INTRODUCTION
2
Indian gaming, perhaps more so than any issue facing tribes in the last
half-century, is a subject of ever-increasing public fascination and policy
debate. In tribal gaming's second decade of rapid expansion across the coun-
try, the popular media's depiction of contemporary Native Americans appears
to center on a widespread stereotype of wealthy gaming tribes and rich Indians.
On an episode of the popular television series "Malcolm in the Middle," an
Alaskan Native opens a casino in her home and immediately cashes in at the
expense of her white customers.3 The long-running Fox series "The Simpsons"
depicted tribal casinos as being run by mystical yet practical Native people who
wear traditional headdresses and espouse platitudes in stereotypical accents
* This article is based on Kathryn R.L. Rand & Steven A. Light, Staking Sovereignty on
Indian Gaming: Three Frameworks for Understanding Indian Gaming (May 28, 2003)
(unpublished paper presented at the 12th International Conference on Gambling and Risk
Taking, Vancouver, B.C., Canada, on file with authors).
t Steven Andrew Light is an Assistant Professor of Political Science and Public
Administration at the University of North Dakota and is the Co-Director of the Institute for
the Study of Tribal Gaming Law and Policy (http://www.law.und.nodak.edu/NPILC/
tglpi.html). He teaches in the areas of American government, civil rights and civil liberties,
and public administration, and has published articles on Indian gaming, voting rights, and
race law and policy.
f Kathryn R.L. Rand is an Associate Professor at the University of North Dakota School of
Law and is the Co-Director of the Institute for the Study of Tribal Gaming Law and Policy
(http://www.law.und.nodak.edu/NPILC/tglpi.html). She teaches in the areas of
constitutional law, civil rights and civil liberties, and Indian gaming law, and has published
articles on Indian gaming, race law and policy, and feminist jurisprudence.
' South Park: Red Man's Greed (Comedy Central television broadcast, Apr. 28, 2003).
2 "Indian gaming" is a legal term of art that is firmly embedded in the mainstream lexicon.
Throughout this article, we refer interchangeably to Indian gaming and tribal gaming, as well
as to Native Americans and Native people. We also refer to "federal Indian law" and its
concomitant terms of art, while recognizing that to some, each of these terms is laden with
potentially problematic connotations.
3 Malcolm in the Middle: Cliques (Fox television broadcast, May 5, 2001).
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while micromanaging the bottom line.4 In one thread of a "Sopranos" episode,
mob boss Tony Soprano and his crew were surprised to discover that the CEO
of a Connecticut tribe's casino - who "discovered" his Native heritage when
the casino opened - wears an expensive suit, looks "white," and displays a
cutthroat, borderline corrupt "I'll scratch your back if you'll scratch mine" bus-
iness savvy. 5 And a particularly pointed recent episode of Comedy Central's
animated "South Park" series, entitled "Red Man's Greed," depicts virulent
white community backlash against a tribe due to its intent to purchase and
demolish a town to construct a superhighway leading to the tribal casino's
door.
6
These storylines reveal both the place of Indian gaming at the forefront of
popular discourse and the common fundamental misapprehension of tribal
gaming. Only federally recognized tribal governments may open casinos and,
for casino-style gaming, only after a protracted negotiation process with state
government.7 Some tribal casino managers may, at times, don ceremonial
dress, but none would likely do so in the workplace. Most tribal members are
just as unrepresentative of Indian stereotypes as are most Italian Americans
unlike Mafiosos. And, of course, Native Americans are not "red men," they do
not seek to use Indian gaming as a form of vengeance against "the white man,"
and they are unable to simply buy and destroy a city. Yet, although easily
discredited in academic circles, these and other misperceptions and overgener-
alizations about tribal gaming appear to influence both public opinion and pub-
lic policy.
Indian gaming provides a clear lens through which to view current public
policy issues facing tribes and the interrelationships among federal, state, local,
and tribal governments. Many accounts of Indian gaming, however, overgener-
alize due to ahistoricism,8 a single-discipline approach to the topic,9 or overre-
4 The Simpsons: Bart to the Future (Fox television broadcast, Mar. 13, 2000); The Simp-
sons: Dude, Where's My Ranch? (Fox television broadcast, Apr. 27, 2003).
5 The Sopranos: Christopher (HBO television broadcast, Sept. 29, 2002). But cf. American
Indians 5, Sopranos 0 - But With Honors, INDIAN CouNTRY TODAY (Oct. 7, 2002), available
at http://www.indiancountry.com/article/1033953427 (last visited Jan. 20, 2004) (asserting
the episode "left a long way to go in how Indians are portrayed in media but it hit a lot of
good points.").
6 South Park, supra note 1.
7 Federal law requires a tribe to enter into a "Tribal-State compact" - an agreement between
the tribe and the state governing, among other things, the state's jurisdiction over the tribal
gaming operation - before the tribe may operate casino-style gaming on its reservation. See
25 U.S.C. §§ 2703(8), 2710(d) (2000); see also infra text accompanying notes 83-85.
s Journalistic accounts of Indian gaming rarely contextualize current events within the his-
tory of relations among the United States, the tribes, and the states. For example, in Time
magazine's December 2002 cover story on tribal gaming, scant attention was paid to the
history of federal Indian policy. See Donald L. Barlett & James B. Steele, Wheel of Misfor-
tune, TIME, Dec. 16, 2002, at 44 (setting forth a short timeline of federal Indian law and
policy).
I Many accounts of Indian gaming are based on economic analysis. Although we recognize
the importance of calculating gaming's economic benefits to both tribes and non-Native
interests, we believe that the economics of Indian gaming may be understood more broadly
through our third referential framework, the intersections of law and policy, which captures
the idea that tribal gaming's economic impacts also have a social component. Cf Katherine
A. Spilde, Jonathan B. Taylor & Kenneth W. Grant II, Social and Economic Analysis of
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liance on anecdote.'O In this article, we seek to overcome these shortcomings.
One cannot adequately understand Indian gaming, we posit, without situating it
within the context of three frameworks of reference: (1) federal Indian law and
policy, revolving around changing concepts of tribal sovereignty; (2) the law of
Indian gaming, particularly the 1988 Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
("IGRA"), 11 a complex federal statutory scheme governing the regulation of
tribal gaming at three levels of government - tribal, state, and federal; and (3)
the intersections of law and policy, as the realities of Indian gaming are shaped
as much by politics as by applicable law.
A. Federal Indian Law and Policy
Indian gaming is different from any other form of gambling in the United
States because it is grounded in the exercise of tribal sovereignty, a legal and
political doctrine embedded in more than 200 years of byzantine federal Indian
law and policy.' 2 Many academic accounts take as their starting point the
Supreme Court's 1987 decision recognizing tribal gaming as a sovereign right
in California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 3 failing to properly contex-
tualize both that case and resultant law and policy. We argue that tribal sover-
eignty is the key variable driving Indian gaming, yet its realization is
paradoxical: sovereignty fundamentally informs federal Indian law and policy,
but it is also effectively undercut by that same law and policy. Perhaps surpris-
ingly, however, tribal sovereignty may hold a practical solution to the paradox,
an argument we develop in the Article's concluding Part.
B. The Law of Indian Gaming
One cannot understand the practicalities of Indian gaming without under-
standing IGRA, a complex and comprehensive federal statutory scheme gov-
erning the regulation of tribal gaming and thus embodying the paradox of tribal
sovereignty. In addition to shaping the role of tribes, IGRA creates and defines
the role of state law and state actors,' 4 thus providing the framework for resul-
tant outcomes regarding Indian gaming across the country.
Tribal Government Gaming in Oklahoma, 34 n.59 (2002), available at http://www.ksg.
harvard.edu/hpaied/docs/OIGA%20Report%207.1.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2004) ("Certain
critically relevant social impacts [of Indian gaming] cannot be captured by standard eco-
nomic models . .. alone.").
10 See, e.g., Michael Rezendes, Big-Money Draw Spurs Corruption: Tribal Casino Opera-
tions Make Easy Criminal Targets, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 13, 2000, at Al (reporting on
potential criminal activity while acknowledging "[t]o be sure, tribal gaming authorities and
federal law enforcement officials insist there is no evidence of widespread infiltration of
Indian gambling by organized crime").
" 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-21 (2000).
12 See infra Part III.A.
'" 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
14 See infra Part IV.A.
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C. Intersections of Law and Policy
The public policies governing Indian gaming are shaped as much by polit-
ics as by applicable law.15 Indeed, following the Supreme Court's 1996 invali-
dation of one of IGRA's enforcement mechanisms, 16 Indian gaming policy has
evolved through political compromise as much as through litigation and law
reform. 17 By recognizing the politicized intersections of law and policy, one
may overcome the paradox of tribal sovereignty.
In this Article's first Part, we clarify what Indian gaming is and briefly
examine its growth as an industry. In the following three Parts, we set forth
and discuss each of the three frameworks of reference. Underlying each of
these frameworks is tribal sovereignty. Throughout, we argue that tribal sover-
eignty provides the necessary basis for informed and effective policymaking in
the area of Indian gaming. In the latter Parts of the Article, we use tribal sover-
eignty as the theoretical foundation for understanding the empirical realities of
Indian gaming. Applying the frameworks to compare and contrast contempo-
rary examples, from the Pequots to the Plains Tribes, we further the move
toward an explanatory account of Indian gaming from a law and policy per-
spective. In the Article's final two Parts, we first revisit popular criticisms of
Indian gaming. Rather than asking what appear to be the two standard ques-
tions that are the starting point for most discussions - "Who is benefiting from
Indian gaming?" or, more simplistically, "Is Indian gaming good or bad?" - we
ask, "Does Indian gaming embody the exercise of tribal sovereignty?" We
argue that in large part, it does - or, at least, it can. We then set forth a propo-
sal for building effective law and public policy on the foundation of tribal sov-
ereignty that has broad applicability for current and future issues facing Native
Americans, ranging from regulation of Indian gaming to federal recognition of
tribes.
II. WHAT IS INDIAN GAMING?
As the above-mentioned "Malcolm in the Middle" episode indicates, some
Americans - at the very least, those who write network sitcoms - seem to
believe that any person of Native American heritage has the "right" to open a
IS Our work elsewhere consistently reflects this argument. See generally Kathryn R.L.
Rand, There are No Pequots on the Plains: Assessing the Success of Indian Gaming, 5
CHAPMAN L. REV. 47 (2002) [hereinafter Rand, There are No Pequots]; Kathryn R.L. Rand,
At Odds? Perspectives on the Law and Politics of Indian Gaming, 5 GAMING L. REv. 297
(2001) (introducing special issues on Indian gaming) [hereinafter Rand, At Odds]; Steven A.
Light & Kathryn R.L. Rand, Are All Bets Off? Off-Reservation Indian Gaming in Wiscon-
sin, 5 GAMING L. REV. 351 (2001) [hereinafter Light & Rand, Are All Bets Off]; Kathryn
R.L. Rand & Steven A. Light, Raising the Stakes: Tribal Sovereignty and Indian Gaming in
North Dakota, 5 GAMING L. REV. 329 (2001) [hereinafter Rand & Light, Raising the
Stakes]; Kathryn R.L. Rand & Steven A. Light, Do 'Fish and Chips' Mix? The Politics of
Indian Gaming in Wisconsin, 2 GAMING L. REv. 129 (1998) [hereinafter Rand & Light, Do
'Fish and Chips' Mix?]; Kathryn R.L. Rand & Steven A. Light, Virtue or Vice? How IGRA
Shapes the Politics of Native American Gaming, Sovereignty, and Identity, 4 VA. J. SOc.
POL'Y & L. 381 (1997) [hereinafter Rand & Light, Virtue or Vice].
16 Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). See infra text accompanying notes
86-87.
'7 See infra Part IV.B.
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casino. 8 This, of course, could not be further from the truth. As defined by
IGRA, "Indian gaming" is gaming conducted by an "Indian tribe" on "Indian
lands."' 9 What sets tribal gaming apart from commercial casino gambling is
not racial or ethnic heritage; rather, it is the fact that Indian gaming is con-
ducted by tribal governments, making Indian gaming more akin to state lotter-
ies than to the casinos lining the Las Vegas Strip.
Since Congress passed IGRA in 1988, Indian gaming has expanded expo-
nentially. By 2000, tribal gaming revenues increased from $212 million to
nearly $10 billion. 20 Although the growth rates for both commercial gambling
and Indian gaming have slowed somewhat in recent years, tribal gaming reve-
nues have consistently grown at a faster rate than have commercial casino reve-
nues.2 ' Today there are roughly 200 tribes operating more than 320 gaming
facilities of all types, whose annual gross revenues approach $13 billion. 2
Although popular media accounts tend to lump tribes together, providing a
pan-Indian account of tribal gaming, there is considerable variation among
tribes and tribal experiences with casino-style gaming. Many tribes have cho-
sen to comport with IGRA's provisions in order to exercise their sovereign
right to own and operate casinos. Today, about eighty-five percent of the 225
or so tribes in the forty-eight contiguous states conduct some form of gaming
operations on their reservations.23 However, many other tribes have decided
not to pursue casino-style gaming or, in some cases, any form of gaming. Only
I" If anecdote provides any evidence, such perceptions may be widespread. Following a
recent talk before a student group in which one of the authors discussed the myths surround-
ing Indian gaming - highlighting the fact that tribal governments own and operate their
casinos, see Steven A. Light, Who Regulates Indian Gaming? (Apr. 15, 2003) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with authors) - one student nevertheless asked whether he could open his
own casino if he were a Native American. Cf. Karl J. Karlson, Permit Snag Not Stopping
Casino Plan, PIONEER PRESS, June 28, 2003, available at http://www.twincities.com/mld/
pioneerpress/news/local/6188818.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2004) (describing quirky entre-
preneur Albert Leo LaFontaine - in 1959, he tried to sell much of North Dakota to the Soviet
Union for $2 million - and his effort to open a tribal casino in St. Paul, Minnesota, based on
self-avowed affiliation with "a dozen tribes" in the non-federally recognized "Grand
National Council of Confederated Nations").
19 25 U.S.C. § 2703(4)-(5) (2000).
20 NATIONAL INDIAN GAMING ASSOCIATION, The Economic Development Journey of Indian
Nations, available at http://www.indiangaming.org/library/newsletters/index.html (last vis-
ited Jan. 20, 2004) [hereinafter NIGA, Economic Development].
21 NAT'L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM'N, FINAL REPORT 6-1, 6-2 (1999), available at
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/reports/6.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2004) [hereinafter
NGISC FINAL REPORT].
22 These figures represent all gaming operations; that is, Class II (bingo) as well as Class III
(casino-style) gaming. We discuss IGRA's distinctions among gaming classes in Part III,
below. See infra text accompanying notes 71-75. Although staggering, Indian gaming reve-
nues remain less than ten percent of the gaming industry's total. NATIONAL INDIAN GAMING
ASSOCIATION, Indian Gaming Facts, available at http://www.indiangaming.org/library (last
visited Jan. 20, 2004) [hereinafter NIGA, Indian Gaming Facts].
23 STEPHEN CORNELL ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN GAMING POLICY AND ITS SOCIO-ECONOMIC
EFFECTS: A REPORT TO THE NATIONAL GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMMISSION 11-12 (1998)
available at http://indiangaming.orgllibrary/studies/l004-erg-98rept-to-ngisc.pdf (last vis-
ited Jan. 20, 2004).
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about one-third or so of the 554 federally-recognized tribes in the United States
conduct casino-style gaming on their reservations.24
For those tribes that have chosen to open casinos, however, the impetus
has been relatively consistent: socioeconomic adversity. Reservations histori-
cally have exemplified many of the worst living conditions in the United
States. To date, many reservation residents are poor, unemployed, and living
in overcrowded and inadequate housing in communities with minimal govern-
ment services.26
Gaming revenue has begun to rebalance the equation in many tribes'
favor.27 As the National Gambling Impact Study Commission concluded in
1999, "[G]ambling revenues have proven to be a very important source of
funding for many tribal governments, providing much-needed improvements in
the health, education, and welfare of Native Americans on reservations across
the United States."28
Non-tribal jurisdictions also benefit from tribal casinos. The roughly
thirty states with Indian gaming operations, as well as numerous non-reserva-
tion communities located near tribal casinos, have realized extensive economic
and social benefits from tribal gaming operations, ranging from increased tax
revenues to decreased public entitlement payments to the disadvantaged.29
Due in large part to the vast sums of money changing hands, the lingering
perception that gambling is a vice, and tribes' complicated status as semi-sover-
eign nations, tribal gaming is at the forefront of public discourse today concern-
ing Native Americans, having prompted federal, state, and local policymakers
and the popular media to pay attention to tribes' actions to a degree far greater
than at any time in recent history. Not all of this attention is positive. Indeed,
despite what appears to some observers to be a demonstrable, even stunning,
public policy success,3" Indian gaming is more controversial than ever. 3 1 To
understand how best to address these controversies and to formulate sound law
and public policy governing tribal gaming, we turn to our three frameworks.
24 NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 21, at 6-2.
25 See CORNELL ET Aa.., supra note 23, at 24-26; see also Rand & Light, Virtue or Vice,
supra note 15, at 394.
26 See Rand, There are No Pequots, supra note 15, at 53.
27 See, e.g., NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 21, at 6-2; CORNELL ET AL., supra note 23, at
77-78.
28 NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 21, at 6-2.
29 See, e.g., Jonathan B. Taylor, Matthew B. Krepps & Patrick Wang, The National Evi-
dence on the Socioeconomic Impacts of American Indian Gaming on Non-Indian Communi-
ties 5-15 (2000), available at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/hpaied/docs/PRS00-1.pdf (last
visited Jan. 20, 2004); NIGA, Indian Gaming Facts, supra note 22.
30 See, e.g., CORNELL ET AL., supra note 23; Joseph P. Kalt, Statement Before the National
Gambling Impact Study Commission (Mar. 16, 1998), available at http://
www.ksg.harvard.edu/hpaied/docs/98-l.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2004); see also Kristen A.
Carpenter & Ray Halbritter, Beyond the Ethnic Umbrella and the Buffalo: Some Thoughts on
American Indian Tribes and Gaming, 5 GAMING L. REv. 311 (2001).
31 Rand, There are No Pequots, supra note 15, at 55-59 (describing recent vociferous criti-
cism of Indian gaming).
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III. FEDERAL INDIAN LAW AND POLICY AND THE PARADOX OF
TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY
A. What Is Tribal Sovereignty?
32
Indian gaming is fundamentally different from most forms of gambling -
from church bingo nights to the slots at Las Vegas's MGM Grand Casino -
because it is conducted by tribal governments as an exercise of their sovereign
rights. Tribal sovereignty - a historically rooted doctrine recognizing tribes'
inherent rights as independent nations, preexisting the United States and its
Constitution - is the primary legal and political foundation of federal Indian
law and policy and, thus, Indian gaming. Yet tribal sovereignty is perhaps the
most misunderstood aspect of Indian gaming.
Prior to the arrival of Western colonizers, Native American tribes were
sovereign nations living in the territory that became the United States.3 3
Although recognizing the sovereign status of the tribes, the colonizers believed
that tribal sovereignty rightly was limited both by settlers' "manifest destiny"
and the perceived primitiveness of indigenous societies.34 The foundation of
the modern doctrine of tribal sovereignty, which governs relationships among
tribes, the federal government, and the states, reflects these early colonial con-
ceptions. The doctrine was established by Chief Justice John Marshall in the
United States Supreme Court's infamous "Marshall trilogy," handed down in
the early 1800s." 5 In the trilogy, the Court held that all tribes were incorpo-
rated into the United States through the "doctrine of discovery," through which
"civilized" Western colonizers had rights that trumped those of the "savage"
tribes of America.3 6 Tribes were thus "domestic dependent nations," possess-
ing only limited sovereignty subject to Congress's plenary power.37
The Marshall trilogy came during the first post-Constitution stage of fed-
eral Indian policy, the hallmarks of which were forced relocation and land ces-
sions. 38 After halting treaty-making with the tribes in 1871, the United States
adopted a policy of forced assimilation designed to eradicate Native traditions
and culture. 39 During the 1920s and 1930s and throughout the middle of the
twentieth century, federal Indian policy reflected the termination and allotment
era, in which tribal lands were sold to non-Natives and Native Americans were
provided incentives to move off-reservation.4 ° After the Civil Rights Move-
ment, the federal government promulgated a new policy of tribal self-determi-
32 For a thorough treatment of the legal doctrine of tribal sovereignty, see DAVID E.
WILKINS, AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: THE MASKING
OF JUSTICE (1997); see also WILLIAM CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL
(1998); Rand & Light, Virtue or Vice, supra note 15, at 385-96.
33 See generally FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 47-59 (1982).
34 Id.
35 See generally Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 20 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
36 Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 572-92; Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 544.
37 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
38 See generally COHEN, supra note 33, at 62-92.
31 See generally id. at 128-44.
40 See generally id. at 130-38, 145-77.
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nation.4 1 By the 1970s and 1980s, this policy prompted cuts in federal
assistance to the tribes while encouraging tribal economic self-sufficiency.4 2
Leveraging limited reservation resources to promote economic growth and
development proved extremely difficult, however, and many tribes faced the
continuing realities of crushing poverty and other social ills.43 As discussed
below, 4 4 tribes soon hit upon casino-style gaming as a viable economic devel-
opment strategy to compensate for lost federal revenue.
Tribes today have a special status in the American federal system that is
defined and circumscribed by the historical development of the legal and politi-
cal doctrine of tribal sovereignty. In essence, the modem doctrine means that
the United States recognizes tribes as independent sovereign nations, and their
location within the boundaries of a state does not subject them to the applica-
tion of state law, yet they are subject to Congress's plenary power and bound
by the trust relationship between the federal government and tribes.4 5 Tribes
therefore have a unique semi-sovereign status and, accordingly, may be regu-
lated by Congress.4 6
41 See generally id. at 180-204.
42 See Rand & Light, Virtue or Vice, supra note 15, at 385-96.
43 See CORNELL ET AL., supra note 23, at 24-26; see also Rand & Light, Virtue or Vice,
supra note 15, at 394.
" See infra text accompanying note 53.
45 Rand & Light, Virtue or Vice, supra note 15, at 382. See generally DAVID E. WILKINS,
AMERICAN INDIAN POLITICS AND THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 41-62 (2002).
46 As federal Indian law scholar Alex Tallchief Skibine observes, Congress "can, theoreti-
cally, abolish the tribes' right to self-government overnight." Alex Tallchief Skibine, Recon-
ciling Federal and State Power Inside Indian Reservations with the Right of Tribal Self-
Government and the Process of Self-Determination, 4 UTAH L. REV. 1105, 1107 (1995).
The circumscribed nature of tribal sovereignty is also clearly demonstrated by how
many modem tribal governments were constituted. Although the United States Constitution
does not restrict tribal authority to select a form of government or to create political institu-
tions, federal Indian policy has had a dramatic effect on tribal organization. During the
treaty era, for instance, the federal government often grouped separate Native American
nations sharing common languages into a single "tribe," sometimes designating an otherwise
nonexistent "chief' to facilitate land giveaways or reservation administration. As a practical
matter, the federal Department of the Interior's Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) usurped the
traditional governing authority of many tribes throughout the 1800s. By the 1920s, when
federal Indian policy was aimed at breaking up tribes, tribal self-government was at its nadir.
See CANBY, supra note 32, at 57-58.
In 1934, Congress passed the Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. § 476 (2000),
which granted to tribes the right to adopt a constitution, subject to BIA approval. Many
tribes quickly pursued this option. Given the truncated version of self-determination
promulgated by the federal government, the preexisting difficulties faced by tribes, and the
designated role of the Secretary of the Interior, virtually every tribal constitution mimicked a
standard template produced in Washington. Although many tribes subsequently exercised
their sovereign right to revise their constitutions, westernized governing structures generally
prevail for tribes throughout the nation. See id. at 58-59.
Most tribal constitutions provide for an elected tribal council empowered to pass tribal
resolutions and ordinances; however, such actions remain subject to BIA review. Either the
council or tribal members elect a tribal chair (sometimes called president or governor) whose
duties typically are not set forth in the constitution and thus vary by tribe. Most tribes have
tribal courts whose judges are either elected or appointed, and whose criminal and civil
jurisdiction varies contingent upon federal law, whether the parties are Native Americans,
and where the events took place. See id. at 60-64.
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B. The Paradox of Tribal Sovereignty
As the law and policy of Indian gaming is delimited, the peculiarities of
this situation are relatively obvious, but infrequently noted. In theory, tribal
governments' right to conduct gaming on reservations stems from their status
as pre-Constitutional sovereign nations. Although IGRA is often erroneously
identified as the source of tribes' right to open casinos,47 it actually creates a
set of limitations to tribes' sovereign rights. In particular, under IGRA, tribes
that choose to game must submit to federal and, for casino-style gaming, state
regulation.48
In practice, then, tribal sovereignty is a paradox in the context of Indian
gaming: the decision to open a casino is an exercise of a tribe's sovereign
rights, as recognized by the Supreme Court; yet under federal law, a tribal
casino must submit to federal and state regulation, circumscribing that tribe's
sovereign rights. Thus, tribal casinos represent tribes' agreement with, or at
least acquiescence to, Congress' mandate to compromise their tribal sover-
eignty in order to pursue gaming as a strategy for economic development.49
But far beyond Congress' intentions as represented by IGRA, subsequent legal
developments have dramatically increased the political power that states wield
over tribal gaming, as discussed below.50 This has heightened the paradox of
tribal sovereignty, making gaming tribes' sovereign rights more vulnerable to
state power.
IV. THE LAW OF INDIAN GAMING
IGRA's complex and comprehensive regulatory scheme grew out of a fed-
erally mandated compromise between state and tribal rights. In the landmark
Cabazon decision, the Supreme Court recognized tribes' sovereign right to
conduct gaming on reservation lands free from state regulation.5 1 Following
Cabazon, Congress quickly exercised its plenary power over tribes and,
through IGRA, delegated regulatory authority to states over casino-style gam-
ing on tribal lands.5 2 In this section, we provide a brief overview of Cabazon
and IGRA's key provisions.
A. Tribal Gaming versus State Regulation: Cabazon
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, spurred by the federal government's
policy of tribal self-determination in the face of severe cutbacks in federal aid,
several tribes explored various tools of reservation economic development,
17 See, e.g., Iver Peterson, Reluctantly, a Tribe Starts to See Casinos as Being Imperative,
N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2003, at Al (inaccurately referring to "the [tribes'] federally granted
right to sponsor gambling").
48 See infra Parts III.B, IV.A.
41 We initially developed this argument in Kathryn R.L. Rand & Steven A. Light, Staking
Sovereignty on Indian Gaming: Three Frameworks for Understanding Indian Gaming (May
28, 2003) (unpublished paper presented at the 12th International Conference on Gambling
and Risk Taking, Vancouver, B.C., Canada, on file with authors).
50 See infra text accompanying notes 87-93.
51 See infra Part IV.A.
52 See infra Part IV.B.
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including gaming.5 3 With low start-up costs and high rates of return on invest-
ment, bingo halls soon proved profitable, and tribes expanded their gaming
outfits by offering bigger prizes and longer hours.54 The Cabazon and
Morongo Bands of Mission Indians in California offered high-stakes bingo on
their reservations, in contravention of state regulations limiting jackpot
amounts.5 California asserted that its gambling laws applied on Indian reser-
vations, but in California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, the Supreme
Court held that states could not regulate reservation gaming enterprises.
5 6
Using the prohibitory-regulatory doctrine to analyze California's statute,
the Court reasoned that if a state did not prohibit a specific type of gambling
altogether, the state could not regulate that type of gambling on an Indian reser-
vation.5 The Court sought to balance competing interests: tribal and federal
interests in tribal self-sufficiency and reservation economic development,
weighed against the state's interest in regulating gambling to prevent the infil-
tration of organized crime.58 The Court concluded that California's interest
was insufficient "to escape the pre-emptive force of federal and tribal interests
apparent in this case."59 The Cabazon decision was an unexpected victory for
tribes, but as Congress had already identified Indian gaming as a potential regu-
latory problem,6' the victory was short-lived. Congress passed IGRA in 1988,
shortly after the Court issued its decision in Cabazon.
B. The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA)
After Cabazon, competing interests turned to Congress to enact a regula-
tory scheme for Indian gaming. The tribes were largely opposed to state or
federal regulation on sovereignty grounds, but in the face of pending legisla-
tion, preferred federal regulation to state regulation.6" Both the federal govern-
ment and the tribes wanted to preserve Indian gaming as a means of reservation
economic development and tribal self-sufficiency.62 The states, along with
other non-Native gaming interests, called for state regulation of Indian gam-
ing.63 IGRA was a compromise among these competing interests: those of the
53 See CORNELL ET AL., supra note 23, at 9.
" Rand, There are No Pequots, supra note 15, at 51; CORNELL ET AL., supra note 23, at 9.
15 California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 204-06 (1987).
56 See id.
57 Id. at 210-11.
58 Id. at 208-12, 216-22.
59 Id. at 221.
60 See Sioux Harvey, Winning the Sovereignty Jackpot: The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
and the Struggle for Sovereignty, in INDIAN GAMING: WHO WINS? 18 (Angela Mullis &
David Kamper eds., 2000). By the mid 1980s, Congress had begun to explore regulatory
schemes for Indian gaming on reservation lands. Id.
61 Id. at 22 (citing the National Indian Gaming Association's perception that the federal
government had the responsibility to "protect Indians from state interference").
62 Id. at 21-22. States cited the state interest in preventing the infiltration of organized
crime into gaming. See I. Nelson Rose, Commentary, The Indian Gaming Act and the Polit-
ical Process, in INDIAN GAMING AND THE LAW 4-5 (William R. Eadington ed., 2d ed. 1998).
63 Id. at 22. Both the State of Nevada and its commercial casino industry were particularly
concerned that any incidence of organized crime at a tribal casino would trigger a federal
crackdown on state-licensed gaming as well. Rose, supra note 62, at 4-5.
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tribes and the federal government, and those of the states and non-Indian gam-
ing interests.6 4
As an extension of contemporary federal Indian policy, IGRA's stated
purpose includes "provid[ing] a statutory basis for the operation of gaming by
Indian tribes as a means of promoting tribal economic development, self-suffi-
ciency, and strong tribal governments. 6 5 IGRA mandates far more stringent
regulation of casino-style gaming conducted by tribes than by any other entity
- church group, Donald Trump, or any commercial enterprise on the Las Vegas
Strip - in the United States.66 Unlike any other type of gaming, Indian gaming
is regulated at three levels: federal, state, and tribal. Agencies at each level
often have coextensive and simultaneous regulatory and enforcement
functions.67
As we note above,6 8 IGRA defines "Indian gaming" as gaming conducted
by an "Indian tribe" on "Indian lands." An Indian tribe is defined as a tribe or
other organized group that is eligible for federal Indian programs and services
and has been recognized as possessing powers of self-government.69 IGRA
provides that a tribe can exercise the sovereign right to regulate gaming activity
if that activity is not prohibited by federal or state law.v
One of IGRA's key innovations was its categorization of tribal gaming for
purposes of regulation." Pursuant to IGRA, the type, or "Class," of gaming
determines regulatory jurisdiction. Tribes have exclusive regulatory jurisdic-
tion over "Class I" gaming, consisting of social games and traditional tribal
gambling.72 With federal oversight by the National Indian Gaming Commis-
sion, tribes also have authority to regulate bingo and non-banking card games,
or "Class II" gaming.73 "Class III" gaming, or casino-style gambling, includes
all types of gaming not in Class I or II, such as slot machines, electronic fac-
similes of games, and banking card games. As discussed below," before a
tribe may conduct Class III gaming, the tribe must enter into an agreement with
the state.
6 See Harry Reid, Commentary, The Indian Gaming Act and the Political Process, in
INDIAN GAMING AND THE LAW 15, 19 (William R. Eadington ed., 2d ed. 1998).
65 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1) (2000).
66 NATIONAL INDIAN GAMING ASSOCIATION, Regulation of Indian Gaming, available at
http://www.indiangaming.org/info/pr/presskitlregulation.shtml (last visited Jan. 20, 2004).
67 See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b) (2000) (allocating regulatory jurisdiction of Class II gaming to
tribes with federal oversight); 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(4) (2000) (preserving tribes' right to reg-
ulate Class III gaming, concurrent with state regulation).
68 See supra text accompanying note 19.
69 25 U.S.C. § 2703(5) (2000).
70 Id. § 2701(5).
71 United States Senator Harry Reid (D-Nevada) was one of several members of Congress
who were instrumental in developing IGRA's regulatory framework. See Reid, supra note
64, at 18 (discussing "two basic questions" faced by policymakers: "how should different
types of gaming operations be categorized or classified, and what is the appropriate level of
regulation for each class of gaming?").
72 25 U.S.C. §§ 2703(6), 2710(a)(1) (2000).
73 Id. §§ 2703(7)(A), 2710(b).
74 Id. §§ 2703(8), 2703(7)(B).
71 See infra text accompanying notes 83-84.
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Through IGRA, Congress authorized the creation of the National Indian
Gaming Commission ("NIGC"), an independent federal regulatory agency
within the Department of the Interior, with overarching regulatory authority
over tribal gaming.76 The NIGC is comprised of a chair appointed by the Pres-
ident and two associate members appointed by the Secretary of the Interior.7 7
It is extensively empowered to monitor gaming activities, hold hearings, and
promulgate regulations.7 8
In addition to regulating gaming practices, IGRA conditions how tribes
may use gaming revenue, ostensibly due to Congress's concerns about organ-
ized crime.79 Net revenue may not be used for purposes other than to fund
tribal government or programs, provide for the general welfare of the tribe or
its members, promote economic development, donate to charity, or fund local
agencies.8 ° If the tribe wishes to distribute per capita revenue payments to its
members, it must meet several conditions, including receiving federal approval
by the Secretary of the Interior and subjecting payments to federal taxation.8
The vast majority of tribes use gaming revenue to fund essential government
services, improve reservation infrastructure, and pursue economic
development.8 2
While the legal doctrine of tribal sovereignty provided the foundation for
the Cabazon decision and IGRA, both the law of Indian gaming and its judicial
interpretation can be read as reflecting a compromised version of sovereignty,
revealing the paradox of tribal sovereignty. We turn now to a discussion of the
resultant politicized intersections of law and policy.
V. INTERSECTIONS OF LAW AND POLICY
Through IGRA, Congress carefully crafted a balance of power between
states and tribes in requiring government-to-government negotiation of "tribal-
state compacts" regulating casino-style gaming. That balance, however, was
76 25 U.S.C. §§ 2704-06, 2710-16 (2000) (detailing the powers of the NIGC).
77 Id. §§ 2704. At least two Commission members must be enrolled members of a tribe,
and no more than two Commission members may be members of the same political party.
Id. § 2706 (2000). The Commission's current members, appointed in December 2002, are
Chair Philip N. Hogen and Commissioners Cloyce V. Choney and Nelson W. Westrin.
Hogen, formerly U.S. Attorney for the District of South Dakota and Associate Solicitor for
the Department of Interior's Division of Indian Affairs, is an enrolled member of the Oglala
Sioux Tribe of the Pine Ridge Reservation in South Dakota. Choney served as the FBI's
Chief Executive Officer for Indian Territory Investigations and is a member of the Coman-
che Nation of Oklahoma. Westrin was the Executive Director of the Michigan Gaming
Control Board. See NATIONAL INDIAN GAMING COMMISSION, Commissioners, at http://
www.nigc.gov/nigc/nigcControl?option=ABOUTCOM (last visited Jan. 20, 2004).
78 25 U.S.C. §§ 2705, 2706, 2710-2716 (2000).
71 See id. § 2702(2) (declaring congressional policy of shielding tribal gaming "from organ-
ized crime and other corrupting influences" and ensuring "that the Indian tribe is the primary
beneficiary of the gaming operation").
80 Id. § 2710(b)(2)(B).
81 Id. § 2710(b)(3). While many observers assume that most tribes are dishing out healthy
per capita payments to their members, this is not the case. Roughly one-quarter of gaming
tribes distribute per capita payments. NIGA, Indian Gaming Facts, supra note 22.
82 See NIGA, Indian Gaming Facts, supra note 22; Rand, There are No Pequots, supra
note 15, at 53-54.
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upset by the Supreme Court. As a result, states - ordinarily without authority
over tribal affairs - have wielded political power to shape and in some cases
prohibit Indian gaming within their borders. With this increased politicization
of tribal gaming, issues at the forefront of public debate are more likely to be
decided through the political process - via compromise or coercion - than
through judicial interpretation of existing law.
A. Tribal-State Compacts and Seminole Tribe
Class III gaming necessitates a special agreement, a "Tribal-State com-
pact" governing the specifics of tribal casinos, which is subject to approval by
the Secretary of the Interior.83 IGRA requires states to negotiate with tribes in
good faith toward reaching a tribal-state compact.84 Under IGRA, if a state
fails to negotiate in good faith, the tribe can then sue the state in federal court.85
In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,86 however, the Supreme Court held
that Congress did not have the power to authorize such an action against a state.
Seminole Tribe was widely regarded as a significant curtailment of the tribes'
ability to actualize IGRA's intended purposes.8 7
As noted above, following Cabazon, IGRA's great compromise was that it
effectively extended to states the opportunity to regulate tribal casinos through
the tribal-state compacting requirement. Indeed, many commentators agree
that Congress enacted IGRA as a safeguard for the states against economic
competition.88 By strengthening states' bargaining power at the expense of
tribes, Seminole Tribe set the stage for the increasing politicization of Indian
gaming.
83 25 U.S.C. §§ 2703(8), 2710(d)(3)(B) (2000). A tribal-state compact may include provi-
sions concerning application of state law, allocation of jurisdiction between the state and the
tribe, payments to the state to cover regulation costs, taxation, remedies for breach of con-
tract, operating standards, and "any other subjects that are directly related to the operation of
gaming activities." The tribe retains the right to concurrent regulation of its gaming activi-
ties as long as that regulation is not inconsistent with or less stringent than the state's regula-
tion under the compact. The Secretary of the Interior will approve the compact unless it
violates IGRA, federal law, or federal trust obligations to the tribes. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)
(2000).
84 Id. § 2710(d)(3)(A).
85 Id. § 2710(d)(7).
86 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
87 Rand & Light, Virtue or Vice, supra note 15, at 401 n. 118. "Original constitutional
objections to IGRA by tribes involved violation of sovereign prerogatives to conduct affairs
on their own lands. They thus objected to tribal-state compacts, because matters concerning
commercial activities involve federal law rather than state law. But now, post-Seminole
Tribe, tribes are squeezed from the other side, for IGRA has no teeth to compel negotiation
on the part of states." Id. (internal citations omitted). Recent federal regulations issued by
the Secretary of the Interior, however, set forth procedures for creating Class III gaming
regulations if there is no valid tribal-state compact. See Class III Gaming Procedures, 25
C.F.R. pt. 291 (1999).
88 See, e.g., Eddie Tullis, Observations from Tribal Leaders, in INDIAN GAMING AND THE
LAW 99, 99-100 (William R. Eadington ed., 2d ed. 1990).
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B. The Politicization of Indian Gaming
Post-Seminole Tribe, due to the various policy imperatives states perceive
from the rapid growth of tribal casinos located within their borders - casinos
often seen by state policymakers as within their regulatory jurisdiction - states
have significantly expanded the regulatory authority of their gaming commis-
sions or gaming boards, or have created new ones.8 9 As IGRA's policy impli-
cations have played out in the form of tribal-state compact negotiations, states
have wielded ever-increasing political, economic, and legal clout over tribes. 90
Despite their lack of constitutionally granted jurisdiction over reservation-
based tribes, states also appear to be taking note of how IGRA's tribal-state
compacting model allows them to leverage state regulatory power over tribes in
other contexts. States have pushed tribes to abrogate aspects of tribal sover-
eignty, including treaty rights,91 while encouraging tribes to make annual reve-
nue payments in return for a compact agreement. 92 Some states have even
refused to negotiate compacts, effectively precluding tribal gaming. 93
After Seminole Tribe, the increased clout of the states has disconnected
the public debate over tribal gaming from the frameworks of federal Indian law
and policy and the law of Indian gaming. Alongside the types of criticisms
levied at Indian gaming that we discuss in the following Part and further below,
the intersections of law and policy, revealed by states' increasing political clout
vis-A-vis tribes, suggest that state agendas reflect public opinion and a zealous
promotion of state interests more than an understanding of tribes' place within
the American political and legal systems or current law governing tribal gam-
ing. As we have asserted elsewhere,9 4 the views of the public and policymak-
ers alike have been shaped in large part by the disproportionate attention paid
to a handful of gaming tribes, particularly the Mashantucket Pequots of Con-
necticut, masking the wide variation of tribal experiences related to Indian
gaming.
VI. THE FRAMEWORKS APPLIED: FROM THE PEQUOTS TO THE PLAINS 95
The nearly unparalleled economic success of the Foxwoods Resort Casino
has made Connecticut's Mashantucket Pequots the most intensely scrutinized
89 California's state Gambling Control Commission, for example, assumed additional duties
under the 1999 Tribal-State compacts, as authorized by Governor Gray Davis. See Exec.
Order No. D-31-01 (Mar. 13, 2001), available at http://www.cgcc.ca.gov/execorderd
3101.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2004).
90 See, e.g., Rand, At Odds, supra note 15; Light & Rand, Are All Bets Off, supra note 15;
Kevin Washburn, Recurring Problems in Indian Gaming, 1 Wyo. L. REv. 427, 430 (2001).
91 See generally Rand & Light, Do 'Fish and Chips' Mix?, supra note 15.
92 Light & Rand, Are All Bets Off, supra note 15, at 360.
93 Rand, There are No Pequots, supra note 15, at 52; Washburn, supra note 90.
14 See Rand & Light, Raising the Stakes, supra note 15; Rand, There are No Pequots, supra
note 15.
15 In this Part, we draw extensively upon Rand & Light, Raising the Stakes, supra note 15,
at 330-39, and Rand, There are No Pequots, supra note 15, at 60-78, where we have further
contrasted the experience of the Pequots to the experiences of the Plains Tribes. In Raising
the Stakes, we introduced the "Plains Model" of Indian gaming and presented tribal
sovereignty as a measure of success of tribal gaming. There are No Pequots contrasted the
"Pequot Model" and the "Plains Model" to highlight the wide variation among gaming
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and highly criticized tribe in the nation. Here, we revisit the oft-recounted
story of the Pequots and their rise from a nearly extinct tribe to the owners of
arguably the most successful casino in the world. In contrast to the Pequots, we
posit the experiences of the Plains Tribes. The Plains Tribes are often cited as
exemplifying the failure of Indian gaming: despite the tribes' casinos, many of
their members continue to experience extreme poverty. The Pequots are illus-
trative of the dozen or so highly successful gaming tribes in the United States,
while the Plains Tribes exemplify the experiences of the majority of tribes with
modestly profitable casinos. In each account, we use the three frameworks of
reference and the foundation of tribal sovereignty to reexamine both the exper-
iences and criticisms of the Pequots and Plains Tribes.
A. The Pequots
At one time, the Mashantucket Pequots were a powerful presence on the
eastern seaboard.96 After devastating conflicts with the English in the mid-
seventeenth century and continued land encroachments by white settlers
through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, by 1970 the Pequots were
reduced to two tribal members living on a reservation of less than 200 acres
near Ledyard, Connecticut. 97 In 1983, after protracted legal battles, Congress
granted the Pequots federal recognition and return of a significant portion of
their land.98
The Pequots were among early tribal forays into gaming as a means of
economic development.99 By the mid-1980s, the tribe's bingo hall generated
annual gross revenues of $20 million and attracted a thousand visitors per
day."° After Congress passed IGRA, the Pequots pursued casino-style gam-
ing, despite opposition from the state and surrounding communities.'0 1 In
1990, in a victory for the tribe, a federal court ruled that because Connecticut
allowed limited casino-style gambling for charitable purposes, such gambling
did not violate state public policy, and thus, the tribe could open a casino on
their reservation.'0 2 Although the court decision paved the way for a tribal-
state compact under IGRA, the types of Class III gaming the tribe could offer
remained controversial because Connecticut law prohibited slot machines." °3
The tribe eventually negotiated a deal with Connecticut for the exclusive right
tribes, and further developed the idea that tribal sovereignty should be used to assess the
success of tribal gaming as public policy. Here, we demonstrate how the experiences of the
Pequots and Plains Tribes evidence a specific proposal for developing effective Indian
gaming law and policy.
96 For a brief and easily accessible history of the tribe, see Mashantucket Pequots, Tribal
Nation History, at http://www.foxwoods.com/TheMashantucketPequots/History (last visited
Jan. 20, 2004) [hereinafter Tribal Nation History].
97 Jack Campisi, The Emergence of the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 1637-1975, in THE
PEQUOTS IN SOUTHERN NEW ENGLAND 117, 132-35 (Laurence M. Hauptman & James D.
Wherry eds., 1990).
98 See 25 U.S.C. § 1753 (2000).
99 KIM ISAAC EISLER, REVENGE OF THE PEQUOTS: How A SMALL NATIVE AMERICAN TRIBE
CREATED THE WORLD'S MOST PROFITABLE CASINO 89-107 (2001).
100 Id. at 108-10.101 See Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Connecticut, 913 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1990).
102 Id. at 1029.
103 EISLER, supra note 99, at 130, 178-80.
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to operate slot machines in exchange for a twenty-five percent state cut of the
slot revenues. 
04
Today the Pequots' Foxwoods Resort Casino enjoys phenomenal success:
located within driving distance from Boston and New York City, Foxwoods
attracts over forty thousand visitors each day.'0 5 As one of the world's largest
casinos, Foxwoods brought in $1.3 billion dollars in gross revenue in 1999, and
the tribe paid Connecticut close to $175 million under the terms of its tribal-
state compact.10 6 The tribe uses its casino revenue to offer a vast array of
services and to make per capita payments of at least $50,000 each year to its
approximately three hundred members. 10 7 Off the reservation, Foxwoods has
played a large part in revitalizing Connecticut's economy. Out-of-state visitors
flock to Foxwoods, as well as to the tribe's Mashantucket Pequot Museum and
Indian Research Center, spurring a boom in construction of nearby hotels and
restaurants. 10 8 Foxwoods has created over forty thousand new jobs in the state
and has impacted the state's economy measured in billions of dollars.'o 9
The tribe's nearly unrivaled success has been a magnet for criticism, much
of it attacking the Pequots themselves: the tribe is too successful, and many of
its members do not fit popular conceptions of Native Americans, as famously
expressed by Donald Trump when he stated that the Pequots "don't look like
Indians to me and they don't look like Indians to Indians."" 0 Two recent
book-length expos6s of the tribe and its casino, Jeff Benedict's Without Reser-
vation'1 and Kim Isaac Eisler's Revenge of the Pequots," 2 purported to use
investigative journalism to debunk the Pequots' status as a tribe. Benedict's
and Eisler's books, and the national media attention they generated, fueled
antagonism against the tribe."1 3 Local residents accused the Pequots of being
"a shake-and-bake and fabricated tribe.""' 4 Benedict, echoing Trump, recalled
his impression upon first visiting the Pequot reservation in 1998: "I saw
$40,000 vehicles, but I didn't see an Indian tribe."' 15 Eisler concluded that the
Pequots were to blame for the harsh criticism: "[i]f the Pequots and Foxwoods
"04 Id. at 148-55, 178-80.
105 Micah Morrison, Casino Royale: The Foxwoods Story, WALL ST. J., Aug. 21, 2001, at
A18.
106 FRED CARSTENSEN ET AL., CONN. CTR. FOR EcON. ANALYSIS, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF
THE MASHANTUCKET PEQUOT TRIBAL NATION OPERATIONS ON CONNECTICUT 1 (2000).
107 Jules Wagnan, Indian Tribe Strikes Gold in Casino World, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL,
Feb. 25, 2001, at 6E.
108 CARSTENSEN ET AL., supra note 106, at 2.
109 Id. at 4.
"IO Joseph M. Kelly, Indian Gaming Law, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 501, 521 (1994) (quoting
Federal Officials Refute Trump Allegations, PR NEWSWIRE, Oct. 5, 1993).
111 JEFF BENEDICT, WITHOUT RESERVATION: THE MAKING OF AMERICA'S MOST POWERFUL
INDIAN TRIBE AND FoXWOODS, THE WORLD'S LARGEST CASINO (2000).
112 EISLER, supra note 99.
113 See Ellen Barry, It's a War of Genealogies, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 12, 2000. Jeff Bene-
dict subsequently founded the Connecticut Alliance Against Casino Expansion. See http://
www.connecticutalliance.org (last visited Jan. 20, 2004).
114 Ellen Barry, Lineage Questions Linger as Gaming Wealth Grows, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec.
12, 2000, at A19.
115 Joel Lang, Reading Jeff Benedict: Should You Believe His Revelations About the
Pequots and the Making of the World's Largest Casino?, HARTFORD COURANT, Dec. 3,
2000, at 5.
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have been victimized by negative public attitudes, it is in part their own gaudy
success that is the culprit."'
1 6
The Pequots and Foxwoods typify prevailing popular conceptions of
Indian gaming, as reflected in the depiction of tribal gaming on television
shows, ranging from "The Simpsons" to "The Sopranos."'" 7 Elsewhere we
have contrasted the experience of the Pequots to the experience of the Plains
Tribes, highlighting the wide range of variation in tribal gaming.' 18 The
Pequots fall at one end of the spectrum of gaming success, marked by the per-
ceived intersections of tribal authenticity and newfound wealth. On the other
end are the Plains Tribes, exemplified by North Dakota's tribes, where tribal
authenticity is not likely open to serious challenge and relative wealth is a vir-
tual non-issue.
B. The Plains
In the heart of the Great Plains of Middle America, North Dakota's five
reservations encompass nearly five million acres and are home to approxi-
mately thirty thousand tribal members of the Standing Rock Sioux, the Spirit
Lake Nation Sioux, the Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux, the Three Affiliated Tribes,
and the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa." 9 Each of the state's five tribes
operates a casino on reservation lands in North Dakota.120
North Dakota's tribes share several commonalities that define and shape
their contemporary experiences, including those related to tribal gaming. First
are the tribes' long history of government-to-government relations with the
United States: as "treaty tribes," they have a strong and long-standing tradition
of tribal sovereignty that continues to shape the tribes' priorities and interac-
tions with state and federal government.' 2 ' Second, economic opportunities
available to the tribes are governed in large part by the resources, natural or
II6 Kim Isaac Eisler, Why I Wrote a Book About a Tribe that Hit the Jackpot, HARTFORD
COURANT, Feb. 25, 2001, at C1.
117 See supra notes 1, 3-6 and accompanying text.
"I See Rand, There are No Pequots, supra note 15; Rand & Light, Raising the Stakes,
supra note 15.
"I See generally MARY JANE SCHNEIDER, NORTH DAKOTA INDIANS: AN INTRODUCTION
(1994).
120 There are currently five tribal casino developments in North Dakota: the Four Bears
Casino and Lodge near New Town, owned and operated by the Three Affiliated Tribes; the
Sky Dancer Hotel and Casino in Belcourt, owned and operated by the Turtle Mountain Band
of Chippewa Indians; the Spirit Lake Casino and Resort in Spirit Lake, owned and operated
by the Spirit Lake Sioux Tribe; the Prairie Knights Casino and Resort in Fort Yates, owned
and operated by the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe; and the Dakota Magic Casino and Hotel in
Hankinson, owned and operated by the Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe. See N.D. INDIAN
GAMING Ass'N, OPPORTUNITIES AND BENEFITS OF NORTH DAKOTA TRIBALLY OWNED CASI-
NOS 1 (2000) [hereinafter 2000 N.D. INDIAN GAMING Ass'N]; Rand, There are No Pequots,
supra note 15. Each of the tribes belong to the North Dakota Indian Gaming Association
and the regional Great Plains Indian Gaming Association, which share information and
expertise, respond to media inquiries, and lobby policymakers. See generally Great Plains
Indian Gaming Ass'n, at http://gpiga.org/home.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2004).
121 For example, the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe in south-central North Dakota is party to a
nearly half-billion-dollar judgment against the federal government over the ownership of the
Black Hills. See generally EDWARD LAZARUS, BLACK HILLS, WHITE JUSTICE: THE Sioux
NATION VERSUS THE UNITED STATES, 1775 TO THE PRESENT (1999).
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otherwise, located on reservation land.' 2 2 As a result of the federal govern-
ment's practice of locating reservations in areas perceived to be devoid of
resources useful to white settlers, North Dakota's tribes have had little or no
access to commercial enterprises on their reservations and few opportunities to
market goods or services produced on-reservation to non-Native popula-
tions. 1 23 Third, as is typical of reservations in the Great Plains, each tribe's
reservation consists mostly of small communities, often far-removed from
urban areas. 124 In the recent past, tribal communities in North Dakota have
lacked commercial development much beyond a local grocery store, and some
homes have gone without electricity, running water, and telephone service. 125
As a result of such constraints, North Dakota's reservations historically have
been among the nation's poorest localities.1
26
In the early 1990s, North Dakota's tribes successfully negotiated tribal-
state compacts with then-Governor George Sinner, allowing casino-style gam-
ing on the state's reservations. 127 To the tribes, casino gaming had the poten-
tial to alleviate poverty, create jobs, improve and expand government services,
leverage economic development, and entice tribal members to return to the res-
ervation. 128 Although rarely discussed in lieu of more dramatic and controver-
sial narratives like the tale of the Pequots' hugely successful Foxwoods Resort
Casino, even modest casino revenues and employment can have a dramatic
effect on tribes and the states in which reservations are situated. North
Dakota's experiences with tribal gaming are illustrative.
From an economic standpoint, North Dakota's tribal casinos are modestly
successful at best, due largely to rural locale and limited access to metropolitan
markets.' 29 The Plains Tribes' profits are only a small fraction of Foxwoods',
yet each of the tribes in North Dakota considers its casino a success. 130 Indeed,
many tribes facing dire socio-economic conditions in the 1990s opted for the
122 SCHNEIDER, supra note 119, at 155; see also CORNELL ET AL., supra note 23, at 26-27.
123 SCHNEIDER, supra note 119, at 155.
124 The Spirit Lake Sioux Nation's reservation is located in northeastern North Dakota,
about 15 miles from Devils Lake, a city of approximately 7,200. See Devils Lake Popula-
tion and Demographics, at http://devilslake.areaconnect.com/statistics.htm (last visited Jan.
20, 2004). The other four reservations are further removed from the state's population cen-
ters. The Turtle Mountain reservation boasts the largest Native American community in the
state: Belcourt, with a population of approximately 2,000. Rand, There are No Pequots,
supra note 15, at 69-72.
125 SCHNEIDER, supra note 119, at 155.
126 Rand, There are No Pequots, supra note 15, at 73.
127 See Peter Smolowitz, Procedure for Gambling Contracts Discussed, AP WIRE, Mar. 31,
1997, available at 1997 WL 2512705.
128 Rand, There are No Pequots, supra note 15, at 75-78; Rand & Light, Raising the Stakes,
supra note 15, at 335-38.
129 Mark Fox estimated the Three Affiliated Tribes' casino's annual revenue at about $3
million. Mark Fox, Guest Lecture in Indian Gaming Law and the UND School of Law (Apr.
24, 2001) (transcript on file with authors). One of the key factors impacting the financial
success of a gaming operation is its proximity to potential customers; that is, the size of
nearby population centers. See Eduardo Cordeiro, The Economics of Bingo: Factors Influ-
encing the Success of Bingo Operations on American Indian Reservations, in WHAT CAN
TRIBES Do? STRATEGIES AND INSTITUTIONS IN AMERICAN INDIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
205, 234 (Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt eds., 1992).
130 See generally 2000 N.D. INDIAN GAMING Ass'N, supra note 120.
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modest increases in employment and revenue generated by gaming in a rural
market. '31 In North Dakota, the tribes' primary goal is job creation rather than
profit margin, 132 and in this respect, the tribes' success is clear: together, the
state's five tribal casinos have directly created over two thousand jobs, 13 3 more
than halving reservation unemployment rates. 1
34
Further, relying on even relatively modest casino revenue, a tribe may
diversify economic development and strengthen the provision of government
services. 135 Off the reservation, non-Indian communities and the state econ-
omy also benefit from modest Indian gaming revenue. 136 In North Dakota,
tribal gaming is one of the state's top economic engines: from 1997 to 2000,
the state accrued nearly $500 million in economic benefits resulting from
Indian gaming.' 37 Finally, employment opportunities created by Indian gaming
have enticed tribal members to return to North Dakota's reservations, as evi-
denced by the 2000 Census: in the last decade, the state's Native American
population grew by twenty percent, while North Dakota struggled to maintain
its general population.
138
Plains Tribes such as those in North Dakota see gaming not as a magic
bullet that will eradicate reservation socioeconomic ills virtually overnight, but
as a realistic policy option with attendant risks as well as rewards. As NIGA
Chairman Ernest Stevens puts it:
Perhaps the most important point is that Indian gaming has served to build strong
tribal governments, and promote tribal economic self-sufficiency. Tribes now have
schools, health clinics, water systems, and roads that exist only because of Indian
gaming. Tribes have a long way to go because too many of our people continue to
live with disease and poverty, but Indian gaming offers hope for the future.
139
VII. TOWARD INFORMED POLICYMAKING: RECONCILING THE PARADOX OF
TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY
A. Does Indian Gaming "Work" as Public Policy?
Indian gaming has been controversial since its advent. Since Congress
enacted IGRA, politics has proven as great a force as law in shaping the practi-
calities of tribal gaming.'4 ° Despite Indian gaming's successes, whether mea-
sured through tribes' strengthened self-government, economic self-sufficiency,
131 See CORNELL ET AL., supra note 23, at 27.
132 2000 N.D. INDIAN GAMING ASS'N, supra note 120, at 2.
133 Dorreen Yellow Bird, Researcher Says Gambling is a Net Plus on Reservations, GRAND
FORKS HERALD, Sept. 3, 2000, at 2C.
134 N.D. INDIAN GAMING Ass'N, OPPORTUNITIES AND BENEFITS OF NORTH DAKOTA TRI-
BALLY OWNED CASINOS 5 (1998).
135 CORNELL ET AL., supra note 23, at 37-40.
136 See generally Jonathan B. Taylor et al., supra note 29.
137 2000 N.D. INDIAN GAMING Ass'N, supra note 120, at 7, 9.
138 Discover ND, Census: Population by Race 1990 & 2000, at http://www.state.nd.us/
jsnd/Bin/lmidata.pl (last visited Jan. 20, 2004).
13 Indian Gaming: Oversight Hearing on the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act Before the
Senate Committee on Indian Affairs (July 25, 2001) (statement of Ernest Stevens, Jr.), avail-
able at 2001 WL 21757798.
140 Rand, At Odds, supra note 15, at 297.
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or the ability to provide basic government services on the reservation, to some
it may seem that the tribes can't win for losing. Others, however, argue that the
tribes have simply won too much. At the very least, all perhaps can agree that
tribal gaming generates public attention and political controversy, with an
intensity far greater than any other policy issue affecting tribes in recent
history.
Exemplifying several of the criticisms of the Pequots and Plains Tribes
discussed above, a number of overgeneralizations prevail in popular media
accounts of gaming tribes today:' 4 1 all tribes game; all members of gaming
tribes are wealthy, like Connecticut's Mashantucket Pequots; tribal gaming is a
policy failure because it has not lifted some tribes from poverty. 
142
In the most prominent of recent media critiques, a December 2002 two-
part cover story in Time magazine decried tribal gaming on a number of fronts.
"Look who's cashing in at Indian casinos," a cover exhorted, adding, "Hint: It's
not the people who are supposed to benefit."' 143 Time labeled Indian gaming
the "wheel of misfortune" and asserted that tribal casinos extensively benefit
wealthy non-Native investors but provide little to the poor." According to
these articles, IGRA thus represents a policy failure of the highest level: "Imag-
ine, if you will, Congress passing a bill to make Indians self-sufficient that
gives billions of dollars to the white backers of Indian businesses and nothing
to hundreds of thousands of Native Americans living in poverty." 145 Time fur-
ther accused tribes of "playing the political slots" by using gaming revenues to
"buy influence in Washington."' 146 Perhaps more significantly, policymakers
have echoed the popular media's call for increased regulation of tribal gaming
due to its alleged policy failures.' 4 7
Individual gaming tribes and NIGA have responded with reminders that
tribal gaming benefits tribes and non-tribal jurisdictions alike, and regardless, is
141 See Rand, There are No Pequots, supra note 15 at 48-49, 55-59.
142 See, e.g., Donald L. Barlett & James B. Steele, Playing the Political Slots, TIME, Dec.
23, 2002, at 52 [hereinafter Barlett & Steele, Playing the Political Slots]; Donald L. Barlett
& James B. Steele, Wheel of Misfortune, TIME, Dec. 16, 2002, at 44 [hereinafter Barlett &
Steele, Wheel of Misfortune]; Donald L. Barlett, & James B. Steele, Who Gets the Money?,
TIME, Dec. 16, 2002, at 48; Ellen Barry, A War of Genealogies Rages, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec.
12, 2000, at Al; Micah Morrison, El Dorado at Last: The Casino Boom, WALL ST. J., July
18, 2001, at A18; Sean P. Murphy, A Big Roll at Mohegan Sun, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 10,
2000, at Al; Michael Rezendes, Few Are Sharing in Casino Windfall, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec.
11, 2000, at Al; Michael Rezendes, Big-Money Draw Spurs Corruption, BOSTON GLOBE,
Dec. 13, 2000, at A].
143 Look Who's Cashing In, TIME, Dec. 16, 2002 (cover).
144 Barlett & Steele, Playing the Political Slots, supra note 142; Barlett & Steele, Wheel of
Misfortune, supra note 142.
145 Barlett & Steele, Wheel of Misfortune, supra note 142.
146 Barlett & Steele, Playing the Political Slots, supra note 142, at 52. NIGA Chair Ernest
Stevens responded that he found it "highly offensive that Time published an article belittling
tribal self-government and the very positive attempts of tribal governments to overcome
dispossession, poverty, and social wrongs for hundreds of years." Ernest L. Stevens,
Response to Time Magazine, available at http://www.indiangaming.org/info/pr/press-re
leases-2002/time-magazine.shtml (last visited Jan. 20, 2004).
147 See Rand, There are No Pequots, supra note 15, at 58-59.
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an assertion of tribal sovereignty, "not a federal program" that is bestowed and
hence can be taken away. 148 We concur.
Tribal sovereignty, we argue, must underlie informed discussion and
effective public policy concerning Indian gaming. Current critiques of Indian
gaming are flawed in their failure to recognize and consider tribal sovereignty
fully. As demonstrated by the previous section's case studies, tribal gaming
must be placed in the broader context of widely varied tribal experiences, from
the Pequots to the Plains. These models of Indian gaming lay the foundation
for examining how, despite its theoretical and practical limitations, policymak-
ers can reconcile the paradox of tribal sovereignty.
B. Tribal Sovereignty as a Measure of Success
The widespread adoption of Indian gaming as a tribal strategy for eco-
nomic development coincided with the federal government's policy of encour-
aging tribes to exercise their sovereignty to grow reservation economies.
Indeed, one of IGRA's express purposes is to "provide a statutory basis for the
operation of gaming by Indian tribes as a means of promoting tribal economic
development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments."
1 49
Tribal sovereignty is a better indicator of success than is an economic
bottom line in the context of Indian gaming. It seems clear, based on current
federal policy as well as history lessons of interactions between tribes and state
and federal government, that the tribes, at least as a starting point, must look to
their own governments for meaningful and efficacious solutions to reservation
poverty. But tribal governments may enact and implement effective policy
only through the exercise of tribal sovereignty. Strong tribal governments,
then, will be better able to address the needs of their communities.
It follows that if a tribe's casino reinforces tribal sovereignty and strength-
ens tribal government, tribal gaming should assist the tribe in seeking solutions
to the problems facing its members, almost regardless of profitability. The
experiences of the Plains Tribes provide empirical evidence for this hypothesis,
demonstrating that even modest casino profits strengthen tribal governments
and preserve or enhance tribal sovereignty. Such tribes, with large member-
ships and little access to metropolitan markets, are unlikely to experience dra-
matic economic and social rejuvenation based solely on casino revenues. Yet
from the tribes' perspective, casino employment and even modest revenue fund
tribal strategies to overcome reservation poverty and accompanying social ills.
As tribal governments are able to use casino revenue to offer their members
employment and educational opportunities, along with essential government
services such as adequate housing and health care, gaming revenue has demon-
strably strengthened tribal governments in North Dakota. This has helped to
preserve tribal sovereignty, as tribes have the economic wherewithal to imple-
ment tribal government policy decisions and programs. Casino profits also
allow tribes to diminish their dependence on state and federal programs, further
reinforcing tribal sovereignty. In turn, the exercise of tribal sovereignty legiti-
mately may be expected to result in healthier reservation communities, by a
148 Stevens, supra note 146.
149 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1) (2000).
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number of measures, as well as an increased likelihood that tribes will be able
to pursue avenues of economic development outside of gaming. 15
0
Further, using tribal sovereignty as a measure of Indian gaming's success
reveals more common interests and goals of tribal and non-tribal governments
than does a simple economic bottom line. Beyond profits to the tribe and direct
payments to the state, tribal sovereignty reveals shared jurisdictional policy
goals and interests among tribes, states, localities, and the federal government,
such as reducing reservation poverty and unemployment rates, creating jobs for
Native and non-Native workers, stimulating local economies and leveraging
economic development, increasing government revenue, reducing disbursement
of public entitlement benefits, minimizing social ills associated with gambling,
including crime and addiction, and facilitating stated federal goals of tribal self-
determination and self-government.
C. Tribal Sovereignty as a Foundation for Success
Tribal sovereignty should provide the foundation for both public discourse
and public policymaking concerning Indian gaming. If, however, as we argued
at the outset of this Article, the doctrine of tribal sovereignty presents a paradox
in the context of Indian gaming - the exercise of sovereignty is accompanied
by its restriction through state and federal regulation - how can the doctrine
reconcile this seemingly inherent paradox? That is, how can one use tribal
sovereignty to transcend the doctrine's own legal and political limitations?
The answer, we believe, lies in tribal gaming. Indian gaming presents
today's most significant opportunity to give practical meaning to tribal sover-
eignty and to reshape how sovereignty is recognized and realized through legal
and political processes. Perhaps no other strategy for reservation economic
development has held such potential, as demonstrated by the examples of both
the Pequots and the Plains Tribes. Beyond generating tribal government reve-
nue and alleviating reservation poverty, however, Indian gaming creates an
opportunity for tribes to assert and exercise tribal sovereignty.
But politics has outpaced applicable law in shaping Indian gaming. While
we concur with those who decry the politicization of Indian gaming as a further
impingement of tribal sovereignty, we also believe it creates the potential for
political actors to reach beyond the legal limits of the doctrine. In the context
of Indian gaming, federal, state, and tribal political actors can achieve shared
goals and interests while at the same time realizing those specific to each,
whether political, legal, economic, or cultural - potentially a win-win outcome
for all involved. Recognition of these common interests and goals reveals how
the maximization of tribal sovereignty is the essential means to their achieve-
ment, and provides the key policy incentive for non-tribal governments to
engage in government-to-government negotiation with tribes.
Tribes are using Indian gaming's potential win-win outcome, along with
gaming revenue, to increase their political clout.15 1 In turn, the political play-
ing field, for so long tilted in tribes' disfavor, is beginning to level as tribes
exercise political influence and power at local, state, and federal levels. As
"I Rand, There are No Pequots, supra note 15, at 75-76.
151 See, e.g., Barlett & Steele, Playing the Political Slots, supra note 142.
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political and economic partners, tribes may work with non-tribal governments
to pursue policy outcomes beneficial to all. In this form, the political process
yields an answer to the paradox of tribal sovereignty: by pursuing compromise
between sovereign governments, one may overcome the compromised nature of
the doctrine of tribal sovereignty.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The three frameworks set forth in this article not only serve as contexts for
examining Indian gaming policy, but also reveal the common baseline of tribal
sovereignty as the appropriate foundation for each "step" in the development of
Indian gaming law and policy. Current policy debate, however, is steeped in
the highly politicized intersections of law and policy without sufficient ground-
ing in either the framework of federal Indian law and policy or the framework
of the law of Indian gaming. Most telling, we believe, current public debate
and resultant policy outcomes appear to have become unmoored from the base
of tribal sovereignty. To be truly effective, as well as socially just, future
Indian gaming law and policy must be built on the foundation of tribal
sovereignty.
[Vol. 4:262
